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INT5QDUCTICN 
"If you can see whether I'm singing or not, 
you've sharper eyes than most." 
Humpty Dumpty 
Alice in Wonderland 
Two young children sit at a table, engaged in a psychological 
experiment. One child, the speaker, is giving instructions to the 
other. "Pick up that one," the young teacher commands. "Do you 
mean this one?" asks his listener. "Yes," replies the first speaker. 
A rather simple exchange, and not, periiaps, very extraordinary. 
Yet the children taking part in this communication experiment 
(Glucksberg & Krasiss, 196?) were separated from one another ty an 
opaque screen, and comments about "that one" and "this one" obviously 
had very little informaticmal value. Glucksberg and Krauss cite 
this exchange as illustrative of the poor communicative performance 
which they feel is typical of the young child. They believe such 
performance results from the child's basic inability to take the role 
of the listener. Because the child himself knows what "this one" 
refers to, he assumes that his listener knows also. 
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As Glucksberg, Krauss, and Higgins (1975) point out, linguistic 
competence does not guaurantee communicative competence, although 
the two are clearly related. A sizeable body of research has now 
accumulated on language development (McNeill, 1970)» yet very little 
attention has been paid to children's communicative abilities. 
Most of the work that has been published has been dcaie within the 
past ten years. 
Much of the pre-1970's research explored the communicative 
deficiencies of the child. Today there appears to be a trend among 
experimenters to look for situations which call forth children's 
maximal skills, rather than their communicative inadequacies. Some 
observers view such a move as desirable. Ginsburgand Koslowski (1976), 
for example, speculate that research in the area "might profit from a 
focus on children's strengths in social cognition" (p.47). 
Before discussing suggestions for future work, however, it would 
be well to examine what has gone before and review the contributions 
made by prior investigators. In this area, as in so many other areas 
of child psychology, both developmentalists and experimentalists have 
been active, and each school has influenced the other. Although the 
field has been dominated by Piaget and his adherents, others from a 
more experimental tradition have also made considerable impact. Shared 
methodology and, in some cases, shared explanatory concepts have tended 
to blur conventional distinctions between investigators in the area. The 
contributions of Piagetians and the more experimentally oriented 
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investigators of referential communication will be discussed 
separately, though the differences between the two on many issues 
are slight. 
Major Approaches to the Study of Children's 
Communication Skills 
The Piagetlan view 
The conclusions reached by Piaget (1926) in his early work, 
The Language and Thought of the Child, have been extremely influential 
in shaping contemporary views on children's communicative capabilities. 
Piaget portrayed the young child as egocentric in his communication 
just as he is egocentric in his perceptions and cognitions. In Piaget's 
opinion, the young child is unable to "decenter" or shift from his 
original view of a situation. Egocentrism, one of the major explanatory 
concepts in Piagetian theory, accounts for the young child's faulty 
interpersonal behavior, as well as for his imperfect understanding 
of the physical world. 
In his observations of young children, Piaget noted that 
preschoolers tended to talk more "at" one another than "with" one 
another; true communication seemed lacking in children under six or 
seven years of age. Often in dyadic interchanges, the utterances of 
one child bore no relationship to prior statements of his conversational 
partner. Each young speaker seemed to say whatever crossed his mind, 
without regard for the needs of the listener. Piaget used the term 
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"egocentric speech" to describe the speech of the young children he 
observed and contrasted this with more mature "socialized speech" 
that serves a communicative function. 
Piaget believed that young children remain egocentric in their 
communications long after attaining a fairly high level of verbauL 
facility. He theorized that continued interaction with others— 
particularly with peers—leads to a gradual weakening of egocentric 
responding. This process takes considerable time, however, and most 
children remain predominantly egocentric until the age of seven or eight. 
Although Piaget did the basic theorizing about the relationship 
among egocentrism, role-taking ability, and communication performance, 
he tended to rely upon observation and his well-known clinical method 
for support of his speculations. The task of operationalizing 
interpersonal egocentrism and devising experimental tests of role-taking 
and communication skills fell to others—most notably to John Flavell 
and his colleagues. 
In 1968, Flavell and his co-workers published their highly 
influential book The Development of Role-taking and Gommunlcati on 
Skills in Children (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, I968). 
Noting the dearth of prior research on this topic, they described their 
work as a "maiden research effort" in the area of social cognition. 
Previous work (Bums & Gavai, 1957» Feffer, 1959; Maccoby, 1959; 
Neale, I966; Rosenberg & Cohen, I966) on the development of role-taking 
and communication skills had made little effort to link these two areas 
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of inquiry. To Flavell and his colleagues, role-taking and 
communication skills were closely related. Adopting a Piagetian 
approach, they stressed the child's "basic egocentrism as responsible 
for deficiencies in both role-taking and communication. 
Flavell and his collaborators (I968) describe their studies as 
developmental-descriptive rather than causal-analytic. As pioneers 
in a relatively unstudied area, they were primarily interested in 
discovering more about children's capabilities and limitations in 
social cognition. Most of their subjects were in second through 
eighth grade (middle childhood and early adolescent years). 
Selection of this particular age range is consonant with the Piagetian 
belief that capacity for ncaiegocentric thought develops around the 
age of seven or eight. 
Subjects in these studies were required to construct scenes 
showing the visual perspectives of other observers, to take the role 
of a police chief communicating to subordinates over a two-way radio, 
to describe a visual display so that a listener might draw it or 
identify it, and so forth. Two experimental tasks devised for this 
study have been extensively utilized by other investigators. Task lA 
was a measure of communication skill. Subjects were taught to play 
a board game by the experimenter. In teaching the game, the 
experimenter used only gestures to communicate with the subject. The 
subject was then asked to explain the rules of the game to a sighted 
or a blindfolded listener. If the subject were capable of taking the 
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listener's perspective into account, then he should modify his 
communication depending upon the visual status of the listener. Older 
subjects (eighth graders) tended to do this, while younger ones 
(second graders) did not. The messages sent by the younger children 
tended to be similar for both sighted and blindfolded listeners. The 
investigators concluded that for the younger children "content of irtiat 
is elicited is largely independent of the nature of the audience" (p.97)* 
Because the tasks used by Flavell and his fellow researchers varied 
in complexity, age functions were not identical across tasks. By and 
large, however, the results supported the Piagetian claim that 
significant improvement in role-taking and communication performance 
takes place during the middle childhood period. Data from numerous 
tasks indicated that these abilities showed rather consistent 
improvement with age. Older children showed greater skill at tailoring 
their messages to their audience, modifying communications in response 
to listener feedback, evaluating the messages of others, and 
constructing effective persuasive comniunications. 
Studies of referential communication 
From experimental psychology kve come other approaches to the 
study of communicative behavior in children. Although the methodology 
is somewhat different and the tasks used tend to be somewhat more 
standardized, many of the explanatory concepts favored by Piagetians 
have also been utilized by these investigators. 
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"Referential communication" has teen the focus of interest of 
many of these researchers. In referential communication, the task 
usually involves differentiating the target stimulus (referent) from 
a set of alternatives. Rosenberg and Cohen (196^, 1966) have developed 
a widely used paradigm. In their experiments, speakers were presented 
with sets of stimuli and asked to provide a description of the referent 
that would enable the listener to select the correct stimulus from the 
stimulus array. Typically word pairs were used. Each pair of words 
consisted of a referent and a non referent. The referent was underlined 
on the speaker's list, but not on the listener's list. Difficulty of 
the task was altered by varying the degree of similarity of referent to 
nonreferent. (Glove-shoe was considered a fairly easy item; glove-
mitten , a more difficult one.) Various restrictions concerning length 
of description or kind of description were sometimes placed upon the 
speaker to increase task difficulty. 
When word pairs are used, the task, of course, is suitable only 
for children who can read. The paradigm can be modified, however, 
and used with everyday objects (Pascual-Leone & Smith, 1969), facial 
expressions (Alvy, 1968; Rosenberg, 1972), novel designs (Krauss & 
Weinheimer, 1964), or other stimuli. 
Rosenberg and Cohen (1966) have proposed a two-stage stochastic 
model to describe the referential processes of speaker and listener. 
The speaker is seen as first engaging in a sampling process in which 
he searches for labels and descriptive terms associated with a given 
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referent. It is likely that there are a number of linguistic units in 
the speaker's repertoire that are in some way related to the referent, 
"but it is unlikely that all these cues will "be equally effective in 
helping the listener discriminate referent from nonreferents. In the 
second stage, the speaker engages in comparison activity, evaluating 
the effectiveness of his chosen response ty comparing it to both 
referent and nonreferents. An effective communication is more closely 
related to the referent than to the nonreferent. (in the glove-mitten 
example mentioned earlier, "hand" would he a poor clue, because it is 
not differentially associated with the referent. "Fingers" would he 
a better clue, since it describes an attribute of the referent that 
is not shared by the nonreferent.) 
The response tentatively chosen by the speaker in the sampling 
stage may be rejected if comparison activity suggests that it is an 
inadequate message. Rosenberg and Cohen emphasize that the speaker 
essentially takes the role of the listener during the comparison 
stage and evaluates the adequacy of the message from the standpoint 
of the listener. If the speaker concludes that his message is a poor 
one, the sampling-comparison cycle is repeated until a response is 
finally decided upon and emitted ty the speaker. 
The referential process of the listener is usually somewhat 
simpler than that of the speaker since response altematives are 
typically well defined in this paradigm and thus there is no need for 
the listener to engage in sampling activity. Instead the listener 
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must engage in a one-stage process similar to the speaker's 
comparison stage, evaluating the available alternatives and choosing 
the stimulus that appears most highly associated with the speaker's 
description. 
As Rosenberg (1972) points out, poor performance by the speaker 
may result from an inadequate vocabulary (which impairs the sampling 
process) or from ineffective comparison activity during the second 
stage. Cohsn and Klein (1968) have argued that vocabilaiy limitations 
are more responsible for the poor performance of children than are 
deficits in the comparison stage. In a study of third, fifth, and 
seventh grade children, Cohen and Klein found that accuracy of 
communication increased with grade level. Third grade listeners, 
however, were nearly as proficient as seventh grade listeners when 
given the clues produced by seventh grade speakers. Because listeners 
apparently were engaging only in comparison activity and because third 
and seventh grade listeners performed similarly when given the same 
clues, younger children must not be deficient in comparison processes. 
The difficulty must lie, instead, in the earlier sampling stcige where 
the third grader's associative repertoire is smaller than that of the 
seventh grader. 
Because the referential processs of the listener is less complex 
than that of the speaker, it follows from the theory that the listening 
task should be mastered earlier. As Rosenberg (1972) indicates. 
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COTisiderable empirical evidence suggests that this is in fact the ceise 
and that at any given age children are "better listeners than 
communicators. 
Another version of the referential communication paradigm has 
been used by Glucksberg, Krauss, and ¥eisberg (1966). Subjects were 
shown a series of six novel graphic designs, each of low codeability. 
These designs were reproduced on wooden blocks, with the same design 
shown on each block side. 
Subjects were tested in pairs, and each person was given a 
complete set of six blocks. The subject designated as speaker received 
his blocks in a dispenser constructed in such a fashion that caily one 
block could be removed at a time. The other subject, the listener, had 
all blocks spread randomly before him on a table. Speaker and listener 
were separated by a screen and were instructed to build matching stacks 
of blocks. As the speaker removed each block from the dispenser, he 
attempted to describe that block to the listener so that the listener 
could select the matching block. Typically subjects had pre-training 
trials using blocks imprinted with animals or other common objects 
before beginning experimental trials with the novel designs. 
The block stacking task has been used to study referential 
communication skills across a wide age range. As one might expect, 
there is a mai^ced improvement in communicative effectiveness with 
increased age. Very young children—five years of age and under— 
have considerable difficulty on the task. In testing children from 
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private nursery schools, Glucksberg, Krauss, and Weisberg (1966) found 
that children under four years were unable to perform successfully on 
the pre-training task using familiar, easily discriminable pictures. 
Most of these children seemed unable to grasp the rules of the game. 
Slightly older children (four to five year olds) were able to master 
the pre-training task, but in eight consecutive trials were unable to 
complete a single errorless stacking of the six novel designs. The 
number of errors per trial also failed to decrease over time. 
A later experiment (Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969) with kindergarteners 
and children in first, third, and fifth grades again demonstrated that 
performance of the youngest children failed to improve with practice. 
Although initial performance (as measured by the number of errors) was 
comparable across age groups, kindergarteners showed no decrease in 
number of errors across trials. The error rate of first graders did 
show a drop across trials, and improvement was even more marked for 
third and fifth graders. (By the end of the eighth trial, third and 
fifth graders were making fewer than one error per trial on average.) 
Glucksberg acd Krauss (196?) also demonstrated that young 
children are relatively unresponsive to feedback from their listener. 
When the listener (in this case an experimenter giving standardized 
feedback) complained of being confused and asked for more information, 
younger children (kindergarteners and first graders) tended to respond 
by repeating their previous comments, while fifth graders and adult 
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subjects tended to give entirely new descriptions. Kindergarteners 
and first graders were also more likely to respond to requests for 
more information with silence. 
Although it is possible to use an experimental confederate as 
listener or speaker in this paradigm, much of the research with the 
block stacking task has used naive subjects in both roles. In such 
cases, it is difficult to determine whether communicative failure is 
due primarily to speaker or to listener performance. Krauss and 
Glucksberg (1969) acknowledge that children tend to be poorer decoders 
than adults. When college subjects were given clues offered by school 
children on trial one of the experimental task, their performance 
improved as a function of the speaker's grade. Adult subjects 
responding to kindergarteners' clues made significantly fewer correct 
responses than subjects responding to the clues of fifth graders. 
Yet, as mentioned earlier, when same-age dyads were tested on this 
task, no significant differences in performance were noted among age 
groups on trial one. These differences in accuracy of response to 
first clues suggest that children are less proficient than adults in 
the listener role and less able to extract information from the 
speaker's early clues. 
Although Glucksberg, Krauss, and Higgins (1975) do not discount the 
role of the listener entirely, they contend that the speaker's role is 
far more crucial and that the percentage of variance attributable to 
the speaker is considerably greater. To support their view, they cite 
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data showing that when adults axe used as speakers, nursery school 
children have proved capable of correctly stacking the design blocks. 
When adequate messages are given, at least some five-year olds appear 
able to perform the listener role with a fair degree of accuracy. 
Krauss and Chicks berg (196?) conclude that grade school children 
fail to approach adult competence in both listening and speaking 
ability, but agree with Rosenberg (1972) that listener proficiency 
seems to develop earlier than speaking ability and to be of relatively 
lesser importance on this particular task. 
Clucks berg and Krauss (195?) believe that communication deficiencies 
shown by young children result primarily from failure to "edit" speech 
for the listener. They identify two extremes of verbal encoding: 
social, or edited, speech and nonsocial, or unedited, speech. In 
their opinion, the speech of the young child "bears more than a passing 
resemblance to free woid association" (Clucksberg & Krauss, 196?, p.310). 
The child fails to edit his speech before emitting it: he fails to take 
the role of his listener. His speech tends, consequently, to be highly 
idiosyncratic and filled with private imagery. The older speaker is 
able to take into account both the stimulus array and the listener and 
is able to adjust his encodings to his listener's needs. 
As the above summary suggests, the views of Clucksberg and Krauss 
are virtually identical to those of Piaget. Like Piaget, these authors 
stress egocentrism and inability to take the role of the other as 
responsible for the child's poor performance on communicative tasks. 
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Not all investigators of referential communication, however, see 
egocentrism as responsible for children's communicative failures. Asher 
and his colleagues (Asher, 1976; Asher & Oden, 1976; Asher & Parke, 1975) 
believe that poor communication results not from the speaker's egocentrism 
or lack of role-taking ability, but from the speaker's failure to 
consider nonreferents when formulating a message. According to Asher, 
in the comparison activity stage the speaker must evaluate his message 
to make sure that his clue is more closely associated with the referent 
than with nonreferents. Having done this, the speaker must then check 
to make sure his clue is understandable to the listener (it is at this 
point that he must take the role of the listener). Both steps are essential 
if communication is to be effective. 
Glucksbexg and Krauss emphasize the second step in this process, but 
Asher believes it is the first step that is crucial. Asher and his 
colleagues theorize that children who complete the first step but not the 
second will produce egocentric clues of value only to themselves. If 
children do not complete the first step—if, in other words, comparison 
activity is inadequate—then clues produced by the children will be no 
more meaningful to themselves than to strangers. 
In his work on referential communication, Asher has amassed some 
evidence in support of his contention that it is faulty comparison 
activity, not egocentrism, that accounts for poor communicative 
performance. Asher's work will be examined in greater detail in the 
following section. 
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Issues in fîecent Research 
Most of the pre-1970 experimental work on communicative skills 
in children was done with elementary school and adolescent subjects. 
The little work done with preschoolers Clucksberg and Krauss and 
by Flavell and his coworkers) gave support to Piaget's views regarding 
the egocentrism of the young child's communicaticai. In the last five 
or six years, however, a number of studies have appeared that question 
this viewpoint and suggest that young children are more competent 
communicators than previous investigations revealed. Recent 
naturalistic resecirch (Garvey & Hogan, 1973» Mueller, 1972) provides 
evidence that preschool children communicate fairly effectively with 
one another in play settings. A few experimental studies 
(Maratsos, 1973» Meissner & Apthorp, 1976; Menig-Peterson, 1975) 
have also supplied data indicating that young children can take their 
listener's perspective into account. 
At present, debate seems to center around three topics: 
(a) the effect of methodology and task complexity upon performance, 
(b) the extent to which young children are truly egocentric, and 
(c) the value of explanations of egocentrism versus comparison 
activity in accounting for poor communication performance. 
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The Influence of task complexity on -performance 
Critics of Piagetian methodology have become increasingly vocal 
in the past few years. Many investigators maintain that task difficulty 
obscures the young child's capacity to take nonsgocentric perspectives, 
(he of the most heavily criticized tasks has been Piaget'o >rell-4mown 
perspective-taking test, the mountain scene. On this task children are 
tested for their ability to predict the appearance of three mountains 
from positions other than their own. Young children find this task 
extremely difficult, leading Piaget andInhelder (1956) to conclude that 
these children "cannot imagine" any perspective but their own. Studies 
by Boike (1975), GameradRant (1972), Hoy (1974), and Eiser (1974), 
however, indicate that on simpler perspective-taking tasks young 
children perform considerably better. When toys or other discrete, 
easily differentiated objects have been substituted for the three 
mountains, even preschoolers appear capable of accurate 
perspective -taking (Borice, 1975)* As Gamer and Plant (1972) have 
charged, the egocentrism found ly Piaget on his three-mountaiin task 
and on other perspective-taking tasks may be more a function of his 
methodology than of the children's thought. 
Tasks used specifically for assessing children's communicative 
capabilities have similarly been criticized for their level of 
difficulty (Hetherington & Mclntyre, 1975; Hoffman, 1975; Maratsos, 
1973; Mueller, 1972; Shatz & Gelman, 1973)* Efforts are now being 
made to develop tasks that call forth "optimal communicative competence" 
17 
(Meissner & Apthorp, 1976). Although much more is known about 
condltlcms that elicit poor communicative performance than conditions 
that elicit maximal performance, there seems to be some agreement that 
less complex tasks are needed. 
How egocentric are young children? 
Evidence from naturalistic studies and from experiments using 
simpler tasks suggests that the young child may be considerably less 
egocentric in his communications than was previously thought. Mueller 
(1972), for example, videotaped exchanges between same-sex preschool 
dyads in a playroom. In contrast to Piaget's observations, Mueller 
found that 62% of the recorded utterances received a definite response 
from the other child and less than 1% of the utterances were poorly 
adapted to the listener's perspective. In a similar study (Garvey & 
Hogan, 1973)» previously acquainted preschoolers in a free play 
situati<xi were found to engage in "mutually responsive" conversations. 
Although many instances of egocentric speech were noted, most of the 
time (66%) was spent in social interaction. Some dyads produced 
conversational sequences of considerable length; in a few pairs, 
twelve or more successive, alternating remarks by the conversing 
children were noted. 
Piagetians have stressed that young children's communicative 
difficulties are based on an inability to take the role of another. 
Communication should be especially difficult when the child is 
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communicating to a listener whose perspective is different from his 
own. Shatz and Gelman (1973) present evidence to suggest, however, 
that young children do alter their speech to fit their listener. 
Four-year old subjects in this study tended to simplify their speech 
when talking to two-year olds in both naturalistic and task-oriented 
situations. When communicating with these younger children, the 
4-year olds used shorter and less complex sentences and more attention-
attracting statements than when talking with adults. 
Menig-Peterson (1975) has also examined preschoolers* abilities 
to take listener characteristics into account when communicating. 
Nursery school children in this experiment first participated in a 
variety of tasks with an adult, and then, one week later, discussed 
their experiences with either a knowledgeable or a naive listener. 
Children were capable of tailoring their communication to the 
listener's perspective by taking into account the amount of knowledge 
the listener had about the earlier events. 
Two recent investigations (Maratsos, 1973» Meissner & Apthorp, 
(1976) have used versions of the blindfolded listener paradigm 
(Flavell et , 1968) described earlier in this paper. In both 
studies, preschool children were required to specify desired toys to 
a sighted or nonsighted experimenter. Although children in both 
studies frequently pointed when communicating with a sighted listener, 
children tended to call the toys by name when the experimenter could 
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not see. Instructions to the 'blindfolded experimenter were judged 
generally more adequate than instructions to the sighted listener. 
Although some woijcers (Susswein & Smith, 1975! Chandler & 
Greenspan, 1972) maintain that young children are overwhelmingly 
egocentric, many are coming to the conclusion reached by Hetherington 
aadMclhiyre (1975) in their recent Annual Review of Psychology article 
that the traditional Piagetian view needs to be questioned. 
Poor communication : Egocentrism or faulty comparison activity? 
Asher and his colleagues (Asher, 1976; Asher & Oden, 1976; 
Asher & Parke, 1975) have done an interesting set of studies 
examining children's performance on the referential communication 
task devised byCoher» andK2ein(l968). In each of these three 
experiments, subjects were shown a list of word pairs. Che word 
in each pair was designated the referent, and the speaker was 
instructed to give the listener a verbal cue that would help him to 
identify the referent. (Because children have to be able to read in 
order to perform this task, only children in second grade and above 
have been used.) 
Asher and Parke (1975) found that the task became more and more 
difficult as the two words in the pair became Increasingly similar. 
(The item city-wash, for instance, was relatively easy; the item 
mad-angry was considerably more difficult.) On dissimilar pairs like 
city-wash, second-graders performed about as well as sixth graders. 
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Ch similar pairs, however, a significant age difference was found. 
As her and Parke explain this finding hy speculating that only sampling 
activity is required for successful performance on dissimilar pairs, 
while both sampling and comparison activities are required for success 
on similar pairs. Thus inadequate comparison activity must account 
for the poor performance of the younger children. 
In a later study, Asher (1976) demonstrated that younger children 
(again second graders) were poor at evaluating the effectiveness of 
word clues and tended to overestimate their quality. Better 
communicators also tended to be better evaluators of messages. These 
results again suggest that poor communication is related to ineffective 
comparison activity, 
Asher and Cden(l9?6 ) , in a third study, attempted to determine if 
poor communicative performance resulted primarily from egocentrism. 
As discussed earlier, Piagetians and others who stress egocentrism as 
responsible for communicative inadequacies contend that egocentric 
speakers use private imagery—their messages are meaningful to 
themselves, yet often have very little meaning to their listeners. 
Although the assumption that egocentric messages are meaningful to the 
sender is central to Piagetian theory, very little evidence exists to 
support this notion. Only one study, prior to that of Asher and Oden, 
had used children as "listeners" for their own messages. In this 
study (Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 1966), nursery school children, 
though incapable of communicating effectively to peers, could perform 
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successfully on the novel design communication task when given their 
own idiosyncratic names of the shapes. As Asher and Oden note, 
children were tested with their own clues immediately after the 
communication task, and it seems likely that memoiy alone may have 
accounted for their performance. 
In the Asher and Cden study, children were seen two weeks sifter 
the original referential communication experiment and were tested 
to see if they could respond accurately to their own clues. Poor 
communicators were not any more effective than other subjects in 
responding to their own clues. This finding suggests that the clues 
of the poor communicators do not have private meaning—they are 
simply poor clues. Arguing against egocentrism as the explanation for 
poor performance, Asher and Oden conclude that ineffective communication 
results from failure to compare the associative strength of potential 
messages to the referent and non-referents. Poor communicators, in 
other words, are children whose faulty comparison activities make 
their clues of no more value to themselves than to their listeners. 
The Present Study 
Verbal versus gestural communication 
Because most of the tasks in communication experiments are of a 
verbal nature, if vocabulary development per se is the major 
determinant of performance, then younger children will be at a 
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considerable disadvantage and will appear to be poorer communicators 
than they actually are. Some investigators (Borice, 1972, 1975» 
Hetherington & Mclntyre, 1975; Hoffman, 1975; Maratsos, 1973) have 
charged that tasks used in typical communication and role-taking 
experiments are extremely complex and tap verbal skills rather than 
social cognition. To overcome this criticism, it is necessary to use 
simpler tasks and, in some cases, tasks that are essentially nonverbal. 
Flavell, eJLal. (1968) suggested that investigation be made of children's 
capabilities to communicate through gestures. Although gestural 
communication might in some respects be "easier" for the preschool 
child, these workers speculated that children would display egocentrism 
here analogous to that evidenced on verbal tasks. "We would likely 
see...the gestural equivalent of the coding-for-self-alone strategy 
which so often seems to characterize the young child's verbal 
messages" (Flavell, et al.. 1968, p.225). 
It appears that only one experimental study (Pascual-Leone & 
Smith, 1969) has compared gestural and verbal methods of communication 
among children. The Pascual-Leone and Smith paradigm seems to offer 
certain advantages in attempting to determine whether communication 
failure results from restricted vocabulary development. Children 
could be given simple referential communication tasks and instructed 
to communicate either with gestures or with words. Poor performance 
on both tasks could be interpreted as a sign of poor role-taking skills 
or imperfect comparison activities. If, however, children do more 
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poorly on verbal encoding than on gestural encoding (as was the case 
in the Pascual-Leone and Smith study), this would seem to provide 
additional support for the notion that the child's lack of verbal 
skills are in fact masking his capacity to take the role of the other. 
Taking the listener's -perspective 
Validity of the egocentrism position can be tested ly arranging 
the experimental situation so that the speaker must take the listener's 
characteristics into account if the communication is to be successful. 
Piaget, Clucksberg, and Krauss, and others who stress the inability of 
the young child to take other perspectives have theorized that 
children fail to edit their comments for listeners, not recognizing 
that listeners sometimes lack information available to the speaker. 
By manipulating characteristics of the listener, experimenters have 
attempted to assess the young child's ability to alter his 
communication appropriately. Although the work of Flavell and his 
colleagues (1968) suggested that second graders still behave 
egocentrically on such a task, other, more recent work (Maratsos, 1973î 
Meissner & Apthorp, 1976) indicates that when simpler tasks are used, 
even preschool children are capable of taking the listener's 
perspective into account. 
In both of these latter studies, children were required to 
communicate simple requests to a sighted or a blindfolded experimenter. 
Less is known about the child's capacity to communicate differentially 
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to peers. Earlier studies of dyadic communication in young children 
(such as that of Kzauss and Clucksterg, 1969) have generally used very 
complex tasks that seem beyond the verbal and conceptual capabilities 
of the child. Naturalistic observations of preschool children in free 
play situations suggest, as was discussed earlier, that young children 
are capable of carrying on genuine communication "well adapted to the 
listener's perspective" (Mueller, 1972, p.937). It remains to be 
demonstrated that children can evidence comparable skill in dyadic 
communication with a peer in a controlled experimental setting, 
Piaget and Inhelder( 1936) have speculated that children are more 
egocentric when talking with adults than when talking with peers, 
while Yygotsky (1962) has held that children are most egocentric when 
talking to peers and other listeners most like themselves. In view of 
the paucity of data on communication between preschoolers in an 
experimental situation, it would seem that this area merits further 
investigation. 
The effect of minforcement 
In his model of interpersonal inference, Flavell (197^) points out 
that after children become aware that others have perceptions which 
differ from their own, they must in some way be motivated to use the 
skills that they possess. Like others in the area, Flavell contends 
there is a considerable gap between the child's capacity for social 
cognition and the amount of social cognition actually demonstrated. 
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The distinction Flavell draws between ability and performance 
is a familiar one, and one emphasized by social leeiming theorists 
such asBanduraand Walters (1963) and Mischel (l97l). It is common 
for behaviorists to differentiate between acquisition and performance; 
a behavior may have been learned but may not be performed if 
reinforcement is lacking. 
It seems plausible that children's performance on communicative 
tasks might be improved by making reinforcement contingent upcm 
successful communication. The use of reinforcement appears to have 
been almost completely neglected by experimenters in this area. 
Krauss ad Clicks berg (1969) do report rewarding subjects with small 
plastic charms after successful completion of a stacking trial on their 
novel design task. Since the youngest children in the study 
(preschoolers) were incapable of errorless performance and since 
shaping procedures were apparently not used, jyounger children received 
no rewards m the experimental trials. Che doubts the efficacy of such 
a reinforcement schedule on initial learning. 
Disinterest in the effects of reinforcement on communication 
performance may reflect a Piagetlan disdain for the more mechanistic 
behavioral approach. Reinforcement has, however, sometimes been used 
in so-called "training studies" in an attempt to teach children 
conservation of weight or number at an earlier age than these cognitive 
skills are usually acquired. Typically these training attempts have 
had little success in promoting cognitive change (Smedslund, 1964). 
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Flavell (1963) has argued that such research may have failed to give 
the reinforcement approach a fair trial. Noting that oftentimes simple 
feedback has "been designated reinforcement, Flavell suggests that 
"reinforcements of a more concrete and earthy sort" might prove more 
successful (p.378). 
Asher and his colleagues (Asher, 1976; Asher & Oden, 1976; Asher 
& Pajjce, 1975) have emphasized that faulty comparison activity accounts 
for much of the child's poor performance on referential communication 
tasks. Failure to take enough time in the comparison stage has been 
cited (Asher & Parke, 1975) as one possible explanation for poor 
performance. Perhaps the utilization of reinforcement might heighten 
the child's motivation and encourage more careful, deliberate 
consideration of alternatives during the comparison stage. 
Hypotheses 
The study described below examined the communicative skills of 
preschool dyads on several communicative tasks. Four major factors— 
reinforcement, gestural versus verbal communication, visual status of 
the listener, and item similarity—were varied. Data were also gathered 
on subjects' vocabulary development and ability to use their own 
communicative clues. An effort «as made to relate experimental 
findings to the various theoretical accounts of children's 
communicative performance discussed earlier in this paper. Essentially 
three explanations have been advanced to account for the young child's 
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communicative difficulties: lack of verbal facility; egocentrism, or, 
more specificailly, lack of role-taking ability; and failure to engage 
in adequate comparison activities. These explanations do not appear 
to be entirely contradictory, although each viewpoint would emphasize 
certain predictions, and at times these predictions would differ. 
Those who maintain that the young child's communicative 
difficulties are due to egocentrism would predict that reinforcement 
would be ineffective in stimulating better performance. They would 
further maintain that egocentrism would be shown in gestural as well 
as verbal communication and that there would be no substantieil 
difference in effectiveness between these two modes of communication. 
Preschool children would be unable to take the perspective of their 
listener into account, and thus messages to blindfolded and sighted 
peers should be similar. Clues offered by the child should have 
private meaning but little communicative value. 
Investigators who consider faulty comparison activity responsible 
for children's communicative failures would make somewhat different 
predictions. These investigators would argue that the clues of poor 
communicators have little meaning even for themselves. They would 
speculate that good communication is related to adequate comparison 
activity at all age levels and across all tasks. If children in the 
reinforcement condition have more incentive to perform correctly and 
if they, as a result, engage in more thorough comparison activity, then 
reinforcement should be related to improved communication. 
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In accordance with Asher's results, those favoring comparison activity 
theory would speculate that children's performance should be poorer on 
referential communication tasks where the stimuli are similar, rather 
than dissimilar, since performance on the former tasks are more highly 
dependent on comparison activity. 
Egocentrism and faulty comparison activity are the two major 
explanatory concepts offered to explain children's poor communicative 
performance. The third explanation, limited verbal facility, suggested 
by Cohen and Klein (1968), has received little attention in the last few 
years. Data obtained in the following study appear useful in 
determining the importance of vocabulary in the communicati 
performance of preschoolers. If lack of verbal facility hampers 
preschoolers' ability to communicate effectively with others, then 
these young children should do better on gestural tasks than on 
verbal tasks. In addition, children who have the most highly developed 
vocabularies should be the most effective communicators. 
The major hypotheses suggested by these three theories 
and tested in this experiment therefore were s 
1. Performance on all communicati ve tasks will be significantly 
better than chance. 
2. Communicative performance of children in the reinforcement 
condition will be superior to performance of children in the 
nonreinforcement condition. 
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3. Children will do better on gestural communication items than 
verbal communication items. 
4. Children will be able to tailor their messages to the needs 
of a blindfolded peer listener. 
5. Performance on verbal communication tasks will be positively 
related to vocabulary development. 
6. Communicators will be no more effective in responding to their 
own poor clues than their original listeners are. 
7. Items containing two similar objects will be more difficult 
than items containing two dissimilar objects. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 88 children attending nursery schools and day care 
centers in Ames, Iowa. The children ranged in age from 3 years 11 
months to 5 years 10 months, with a mean age of 4 years 11 months. 
Forty-six of the subjects were female, 42 were male. All were 
considered by their teachers to be of normal intelligence and free of 
serious speech or hearing disorders. 
Procedure 
Within each nursery school and day care center, dyads were formed 
by matching subjects on both sex and age. (Ages of dyadic partners 
typically differed "ty no more than two or three months.) Each dyad 
wcis tested on referential communication tasks, and a tape recording 
was made of the session. A followup interview was scheduled for 
approximately two weeks later. At this second session, dyad members 
were seen individually to obtain a measure of vocabulazy strength and 
to check each subject's accuracy in responding to his/her own verbal 
clues. 
Half of the dyads were randomly assigned to a reinforcement 
condition, while the rest were in a nonreinforcement condition. 
Reinforced and nonreinforced pairs were given identical instructions, 
31 
but children in the reinforcement condition were told, in addition, 
that they would receive an M & M candy reward immediately after each 
correct trial. 
Because it seemed likely that children in the reinforcement 
condition might talk to other children about receiving candy for playing 
games, some M & M's were also given to children in the nonreinforcement 
group at the conclusion of the dyadic session. Since both reinforced 
and nonreinforced children received candy for participating in the 
first session, it would seem that motivation to return for the second 
session should have been essentially equal for the two groups of 
subjects. 
Dyadic session 
Task 1: Gestural versus Verbal communication The first task 
was a.modificaticai of the experimental paradigm developed by Pascual-
Leone 2fc«dSmith(l969). In that study, young children's encoding 
abilities were tested by presenting the child with two familiar objects 
and asking the child to let the experimenter know which the child was 
thinking of by saying a word or making a gesture. 
For the present study, several methodological changes were made 
in this paradigm. In the Pascual-Leone and Smith research, the child 
communicated to an experimenter instead of to a peer, and the object 
he/she was to communicate about was unspecified, leaving the child 
free to select the one preferred. In the present study, the female 
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experimenter specified the "correct" object in advance and requested 
the child to communicate about the object selected by the experimenter. 
Having a peer as listener rather than the experimenter was another 
modification used in the present study to minimize the effect of the 
experimenter on communication accuracy. 
Instructions to the subjects were simple and brief. Children 
were told that they were playing some communication games and taking 
turns as speaker and listener. The experimenter explained that the 
children would be shown two objects at a time and that their task 
would be to pick the object the experimenter was thinking of. In each 
case, the experimenter showed one child which object she had in mind 
by pointing to that object while screening both objects from the sight 
of the other child. The informed child was then asked to give either 
a verbal or a gestural clue to the other child to help him/her select 
the right object. 
After explaining the task, the experimenter announced that she 
would conduct some practice trials to make sure that the children 
understood the game. Half the dyads, chosen at random, received 
practice trials on verbal encoding and decoding, while the other half 
received practice trials on gestural encoding and decoding. In both 
groups, the first two trials were conducted with the experimenter as 
speaker (or gestural encoder) and the children as listeners (or 
gestural decoders). On the next four trials, the children alternated 
in the roles of encoder and decoder. The subjects appeared to 
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understand the instructions rather easily, with only two dyads giving 
some evidence of confusion after the six practice trials. 
Following completion of the training trials, dyads were tested on 
the first set of experimental trials (eight items). Che child was 
randomly selected to be encoder on the first trial. Qa. 
successive trials, encoder and decoder alternated. Those subjects who 
had completed practice trials on gestural encoding/decoding used 
gestures in the first set of experimental trials; those subjects who 
had completed practice trials on verbal encoding/decoding used word 
clues on the first set of experimental trials. 
After completion of the first set of experimental trials, dyads 
received practice with the other mode of communication. Children 
who had previously used gestures were now given training in the use 
of verbal clues, while children who had used word clues now received 
training in gestural, communication. Again, six practice trials were 
given with the experimenter acting as encoder on the first two trials 
and the subjects alternating in the role of encoder on the next four 
trials. Following completion of the practice trials, subjects were 
tested on the second set of experimental trials. Ageiin, children 
alternated in the roles of encoder and decoder. 
A major flaw in the Pascual-Leone and Smith study, according to 
Clucksberg, et aJL. (1975) was the use of different object pairs for 
verbal encoding and gestural encoding. This confounds the mode of 
communication with the particular items used and makes interpretation 
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of differences in performance uncertain. In the present study, 
different items were not used. Sixteen items were constructed for 
Task 1. Assignment of these items to the verbal or gestural condition 
was made at random for each dyad. 
Each item was categorized as similar or dissimilar by the 
experimenter on an a priori basis. This distinction had previously 
been made by Asher and his colleagues who used similar-dissimilar word 
pairs in their studies of referential communication in older children. 
Here an effort was made to apply the similar-dissimilar dimension to 
toy pairs rather than word pairs. If an item contained toys that were 
much alike (pistol-rifle) or if an item contained toys that tended to 
elicit similar responses (knife-scissors—"cut")» then that item was 
labelled similar. Items containing two quite different objects were 
labelled dissimilar. This classification was based on the experimenter's 
intuition and on the responses given by children in a pilot study. 
Of the 16 items on Task 1 (Table l), 8 consisted of two similar 
objects and 8 of two dissimilar objects. The order of item presentation 
was randomly determined for each dyad, with the sole restriction that 
equal numbers of similar and dissimilar items appear in each condition. 
Thus all subjects received 4 similar and 4 dissimilar items in both 
the verbal and gestural conditions. The particular items used in these 
two conditions were, as indicated earlier, drawn at random from the 
Task 1 item pool. The choice of which object was to be specified as 
35 
Table 1 
Object Palis for Task 1 
Dissimilar 
guitar-saxophone 
s crendriver-hammer 
bracelet-lifesaver 
sock-soap 
apple-ball 
paper towel-paper cup 
bed-chair 
cap-glove 
Similar 
letter X-letter 0 
ballerina-woman 
straight chair-rocking chair 
scissors-knife 
rifle-pistol 
smiling face-crying face 
book-newspaper 
paintbrush-hairbrush 
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correct was made randomly and independently for each object pair and 
for each dyad. Thus order of comxinication condition (verbal-gestural 
or gestural-verbal) was randomly determined, order of individual items 
was randomly determined, and specification of the "correct" object was 
randomly determined. 
Latency of response on task 1 The experimenter recorded 
the amount of time dyads took in responding to each item on Task 1. 
Timing began when the experimenter specified the correct object to the 
encoder and ended when the decoder selected one of the two items. The 
latency measure was included to provide additional data on the relative 
efficiency of verbal versus gestural communication. 
Task Zi Ad.lustment of communication to listener's needs The 
task here was a variant of the referential communication task described 
earlier. Dyads were again presented with pairs of common objects 
(Table 2). Subjects were told that this game also required the encoder 
to give the decoder a clue that would help him/her to identify the 
correct item. On some trials, the decoder would be able to see the 
encoder; on other trials, the decoder would not be able to see the 
encoder. Because the children had received ample practice in verbal 
and gestural communication already, no practice trials were given here. 
Pilot work suggested that a number of young children dislike being 
blindfolded, so a similar procedure less disturbing to the young child 
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Table 2 
Object Pairs for Task 2 
Dissimilar 
train-motorcycle 
block-marble 
lion-truck 
giraffe-golf ball 
Big Bird-crayon 
penny-rattle 
book-bottle 
watch-sunglasses 
Similar 
inflated balloon-deflated balloon 
small Volkswagen-large Volkswagen 
plastic hammer-wooden hammer 
puzzle elephant-circus elephant 
wooden ball-rubber ball 
sharpened pencil-unsharpened pencil 
orange ring-blue ring 
long feather-short feather 
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was used. Instead of blindfolding the decoder, the experimenter 
requested that the decoder turn to face away from the encoder. The 
decoder was not permitted to turn around until the clue had been given. 
Sixteen experimental trials were run, half with the decoder in the 
blind condition and half with the decoder in the sighted or nonblind 
condition. It was determined at random whether the dyad would do the 
blind or the nonblind condition first. After 8 trials in the initial 
Task 2 condition, dyads switched to the other condition for the 
remainder of the trials. Items were assigned at random to the blind 
and nonblind conditions, with the only stipulation being, again, that 
each dyad receive an equal number of similar and dissimilar items in 
each condition. Thus each dyad had 4 similar and 4 dissimilar items 
in the blind condition and in the sighted condition also. Choice of 
the specified object was again made randomly for each object pair and 
for each dyad. 
Unlike Task 1, here there were no restrictions upon the kind of 
communication permitted. The experimenter emphasized to the children 
that they were free to communicate in whatever manner they wished on 
this task, and subjects were explicitly told that they could use words 
or gestures or a combination of the two. 
Scoring of tasks 1 and 2 Items were scored on a pass-fail basis. 
This scoring was done by the experimenter as each item was completed. 
If the decoder correctly identified the object that the experimenter 
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had specified to the encoder, then the item was considered passed. 
Choice of the incorrect object "by the decoder was considered failure 
of that item. Scoring was later checked for accuracy during 
transcription of the tape recordings of the dyadic sessions. 
Subjects had been instructed on Task 1 that pointing was not 
allowed and that they must communicate through words alone (verbal 
condition) or through gestures alone (gestural condition). Although 
these cautions were repeated several times, many children did point 
on Task 1 to indicate the correct object. Less frequently, subjects 
used words to communicate when in the gestural condition, or used 
gestures to accompany their words in the verbal condition. These 
items were not scored plus or minus, but were identified with a 
question mark. 
Most of the questionable items were found on Task 1. On Task 2, 
subjects were allowed to communicate in any manner they chose—through 
gestures, words, or a combination of the two. Pointing was also allowed 
on this task. Task 2 was designed to test the children's capacity to 
communicate to a blind listener for whom words would be the only 
effective means of communication; in permitting the use of gestures 
and pointing, the task was made less demanding for speakers in the 
nonblind condition. Thus if subjects performed comparably on both 
Task 2 conditions, this would seem additional evidence of the child's 
capacity to take tne listener's perspective into account. 
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The only lonscorable items on Task 2 were those that occuzred in 
the blind conditim when the speaker—in violation of instructions— 
pointed to the correct object after the listener had tnmed around. 
This happened infrequently and was not a problem in data analysis. 
Scoring Task 1 items, however, was somewhat complicated because of the 
presence of the questionable items. Two scoring approaches were taken. 
In the first, all administered items were included in the analysis and 
each dyad's score was simply the total number right. The second 
approach utilized only the "scorable" items—those for which no 
question arose. Here a dyad's score was the number correct divided 
by the total number of items scorable (a proportim). 
Results of the two scoring procedures were quite comparable—with 
one major exception which will be discussed in the Results section. 
On the whole, however, the first method appeared more statistically 
sound. Frequency distrilxitions of scores using the first scoring 
.method were approximately normal, while distributions of scores using 
the second method were highly skewed. (There were in the latter case so 
many perfect scores—proportions of 1—that transformation of the data 
would not have been helpful.) The first scoring technique was the more 
conservative, of course, in the sense of its leading generally to 
lower scores. 
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Use of adult .judges Two adult judges (neither the experimenter) 
were presented with all the clues given by subjects on Task 2 
(blind/nonblind) items and in the verbal condition of Task 1. 
All the clues given on a particular item were typed in random order. 
(As clues given in the gestural condition were not considered, there 
were 24 items for each dyad.) 
Mult judges provided two types of information. First, judges were 
instructed to read each clue and indicate which object they would 
select if given that clue. Judges' selections were then scored 
for accuracy and a measure of adult performance on the clues was 
obtained. 
Judges were then asked to rate each clue for its adequacy to a 
blind decoder. These ratings were used to provide a quantitative 
index of the clue's quality. 
In making selections and doing the ratings, each judge worfced 
independently. The following 9-point scale was used in rating the 
clues : 
1—No clue given 
2—Point 
3—Gesture 
4—Stereotypic verbal response ("This one," "That one") 
5—Stereotypic verbal response accompanied by pointing or gesturing 
6—Inadequate verbal response 
7—Inadequate verbal response accompanied by pointing or gesturing 
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8—Adequate verbal response accompanied by superfluous pointing 
or gesturing 
9—Adequate verbal response 
Followup session 
Vocabulary measure The vocabulary list from the Wechsler 
Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (WFPSl) was administered 
as a measure of verbal facility to all children in the study. As noted 
earlier, children were tested individually, during the second session. 
Each child received a raw score based on the number of words correctly 
defined and the quality of these definitions. Baw scores were converted 
into scaled scores so that the scores of children who varied in age 
would be directly comparable. 
Children as listeners of tneir o<wn m.essages To test the ability 
of preschool children to respond to their own verbal clues, children 
were readministered items they had encountered as encoders during the 
dyadic session. Ch half of these items, randomly selected, the 
children were merely asked to see if they could remember the "correct" 
object in each pair. On the remaining half of the items, children were 
offered the clues they had themselves given to their partners. Testing 
was done at the time of the administration of WPTSI vocabulary items, 
approximately two weeks after the initial dyadic session. 
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Major Analyses 
The primary dependent variable was effectiveness of referential 
communication as measured by the performance of the dyads. Simple 
t tests were used to determine whether subjects were performing 
above chance level (Hypothesis l). Analyses of variance were then 
performed for each task, with Reinforcement, Verbal Ability (vocabulary 
scaled score), and Age as between-subject factors and Similarity 
(similar/dissimilar object pairs) and Condition (verbal/gestural 
for Task 1, blind/nonblind decoder for Task 2) as within-subject 
factors. These analyses were used to test Hypothesis 2 (effect of 
reinforcement), 3 (gestural versus verbal communication), 4 (performance 
in blind versus nonblind condition), 5 (relationship of verbal ability 
to performance), and ? (performance on similar versus dissimilar items). 
Latencies on Task 1 items constituted another dependent variable 
that seemed especially relevant to Hypothesis 2 (effect of 
reinforcement), 3 (verbal versus gestural communication), 5 (verbal 
ability), and 7 (similar versus dissimilar items). 
Performance of adult raters on the encoders' clues provided 
another type of information regarding the effectiveness of 
preschoolers' communication. This dependent variable seemed 
particularly suited to testing the relationship between verbal 
ability of the encoder and performance of the adult decoder (analogous 
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to Hypothesis 5) and testing if adults also perform more poorly on 
similar items than on dissimilar ones (analogous to Hypothesis ?). 
Ratings of clues by adult judges comprised another dependent 
variable. The relationship between reinforcement (Hypothesis 2) and 
adult ratings was checked, as was the relationship between blind 
versus nonblind task conditions and ratings (Hypothesis 4), Ratings 
of similar and dissimilar clue items (Hypothesis 7) were compared, and 
the relationship between encoders* verbal ability (Hypothesis 5) and 
clue quality was assessed. 
The adult ratings were also used in determining which clues were 
"poor clues" (inadequate verbal responses). Encoders were then tested 
on these poor clues to see if they were any more effective in 
responding to their own poor clues than decoders had been (Hypothesis 6). 
As this discussion suggests, most experimental hypotheses were 
tested in a variety of ways by running a number of analyses with 
different dependent variables. Performance of the dyads was of prime 
interest, but adult performance, adult ratings, and latency measures 
provided interesting data for supplementary analyses. 
Before performing any analyses of variance, it was necessary 
to dichotomize the two organismic variables, age and verbal ability; 
computer core requirements would otherwise have been excessive. 
Ages of the two dyadic partners were added, yielding a sum for 
each dyad. Dyads were then divided at the median into an older and a 
younger group. Using a similar procedure, dyads were split at the 
k3 
median on scaled vocabulary score to yield a high verbal and a low 
verbal group. Because scaled scores were used instead of raw scores 
on the vocabulary test, the age and verbal ability factors were 
essentially uncorrelated (that is, the numbers of dyads in the 
various cells—young/high verbal, young/low verbal, old/high 
verbal, old/low verbal-^-were approximately equal). The extensive 
dummy coding required for a least squares solution again exceeded 
the core capacity of the computer, and an unweighted means solution 
was used for the analyses of variance. The dyad was the experimental 
unit in all analyses except where otherwise noted. 
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BESULTS 
Mean Dyadic Performance an Tasks 1 and 2 
Mean number of items correct on Task 1 (verbal/gestural) was 11.2? 
(of l6 items), and the mean for Task 2 (blind/nonblind) -was 12.73. On 
both tasks, dyads performed significantly better (2 < .OOl) than 
chance (t(43) = 8.68 for Task 1, t(43) = 14.51 for Task 2). 
Mean scores for each condition-similarity combination are 
presented in Table 3. On all eight scales, dyads performed 
significantly better than chance, with t values ranging from 3.12 
to 13.6. 
Analyses of Variance with Decoder's Performance as the Dependent Variable 
Two 5~fa.ctor analyses of variance (Anovas) were performed with 
Reinforcement, Verbal Ability (vocabulary scaled score), and Age as 
between-subject factors, and Condition (verbal/gestural for the first 
Anova, blind/nonblind decoder for the second), and Similarity 
(similar/dissimilar object pairs) as within-subject factors. The 
dependent variable for both Anovas was number of items clearly 
correct out of the total administered (the first scoring method 
discussed). 
With three between-subject factors, the number of dyads per cell 
ranged from two to nine, raising the experimenter's concern about the 
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Table 3 
Mean Dyadic Performance for Each Condition/item 
Similarity Combination: First Scoring Method 
Mean t 
Verbal Dissimilar 2.75 5.42 
Verbal Similar 2.52 3.12 
Gestural Dissimilar 3.20 8.37 
Gestural Similar 2.80 5.84 
Blind Dissimilar 3.43 12.03 
Blind Similar 2.7? 4.97 
Nonblind Dissimilar 3.5c 13.60 
Nonblind Similar 3.02 7.32 
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stability of cell means. In these 5~fa,ctor analyses, Reinforcement 
was not significant as a main effect or in interaction with the other 
factors. Because Reinforcement had no apparent impact on the children's 
performance, it seemed reasonable to collapse across the Reinforcement 
condition while retaining the four other factors. 
Before doing 4-factor Anovas, ^-factor analyses ware ran to 
check again the effect of Reinforcement on performance. Only the 
manipulable factors (Reinforcement, Condition, and Similarity) were 
included in these analyses. Because Reinforcement was the only 
between-subject factor, these analyses—in contrast to the previous 
5-factor ones—were based upon means of considerable stability. 
(With only two cells, the mean for the nonreinforced group was based 
on 21 dyads, and the mean for reinforced group was based on 23 dyads.) 
Results of these 3-factor Anovas were in agreement with the earlier 
analyses; Reinfoircement was not significant on either task as a main 
effect or in interaction with other factors. 
Because Reinforcement was not significant in either kind of 
analysis, it was dropped from subsequent dyadic analyses. Four 
4-factor analyses of variance ( two for each task) were run with Age 
and Verbal Ability as between-subject factors and Condition and 
Similarity as within-subject factors. With only two between-subject 
factors, individual cell means were based upon 10 to 12 dyads. Both 
of the scoring approaches discussed earlier were used for these 
4-factor Anovas. 
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Task 1: Verbal versus gestural coimunicat!on 
Results of the 4-factor Anova for Task 1 using the first scoring 
approach (total correct) appear in Table 4. All four main effects were 
significant. Older children performed significantly better (2.OjJ 
than younger children (means of 6.02 versus 5*20), and high verbal 
subjects received significantly higher scores (2 ^  • 05) than did low 
verbal subjects (6.00 versus 5«22). Children did significantly better 
(2 .01) on gestural items than on verbal ones (5-96 versus 5*24) and 
significantly better (2 < «05) on dissimilar than similar items (5»92 
versus 5»28). 
Results of the 4-factor An ova. for Task 1 utilizing the second 
scoring approach (proportion correct of scorable items) appear in 
Table 5- In this analysis, only two of the four main effects reached 
significance; Age (2^ .Oji) and Similarity (2 .01). The 4-way 
interaction was likewise significant at the 2 <«05 level. 
Task 7^1 Blind versus nonblind decoder 
Two 4-factor analyses of variance were run for Task 2, using the 
scoring methods previously discussed. As mentioned earlier, fewer 
questionable items arose on Task 2 and thus An0vas using the different 
scoring procedures gave nearly identical results (Tables 6 and 7). 
Because the first scoring method appears the more conservative, the 2 
values and means reported below are the ones obtained using that 
scoring technique. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance Summaiy Table for Task 1 (Verbal/Gestural): 
First Scoring Method 
Source dS F 
A (Age) 1 7.33 
* 
5.59 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 6.61 5.05* 
C (Condition) 1 5.69 8.98** 
D (Similarity) 1 4.48 4.72* 
A X B 1 0.0898 0.07 
A X C 1 0.939 1.48 
A X D 1 0.0312 0.03 
B X C 1 0.854 1-35 
B X D 1 0.376 0.40 
C X D 1 0.474 0.71 
A X B X C 1 2.07 3.26 
A X B X D 1 0.181 0.19 
A X C X D 1 0.423 0.64 
B X C X D 1 0.150 0.23 
A X B X C X D 1 1.57 2.36 
S (Subjects) 40 1.31 
S X C 40 0.634 
S X D 40 0.949 
S X G X D 40 0.664 
*£ C .05 
** 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Task 1 (Verbal/Gestural) : 
Second Scoring Method 
Source âS F 
A (Age) 1 0.356 4.94* 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 0.0154 0.21 
C (Condition) 1 0.0173 0.45 
D (Similarity) 1 0.5^5 
•JHÇ-
10.70 
A X B 1 0.000311 0.00 
A X C 1 0.0122 0.32 
A X D 1 0.0158 0.31 
B X C 1 0.00879 0.23 
B X D 1 0.00976 0.19 
C X D 1 0.00225 0.06 
A X B X G 1 0.0891 2.34 
A X B X D 1 0.0129 0.25 
A X C X D 1 0.000706 0.02 
B X C X D 1 0.0679 1.81 
A X B X C X D 1 0.217 5.76* 
S (Subjects) 40 0.0721 
S X C 40 0.0381 
S X D 40 0.0509 
S X C X D 40 0.0376 
*2 ^  "05 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Task 2 (Blind/Nonblind): 
First Scoring Method 
Source MS F 
A (Age) 1 5.13 4.66* 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 0.67 0.61 
C (Condition) 1 1.08 1.34 
D ( Similarity) 1 15.01 
, _ *** 
26.65 
A X B 1 0.20 0.18 
A X G 1 0.19 0.24 
A X D 1 0.88 1.57 
B X C 1 1.87 2.32 
B X D 1 0.07 0.12 
C X D 1 0.39 0.75 
A X B X C 1 0.59 0.73 
A X B X D 1 2.38 4.22* 
A X C X D 1 0.00 0.01 
B X C X D 1 0.85 1.65 
A X B X C X D 1 0.14 0.27 
S (Subjects) 40 1.10 
S X C 40 0.81 
S X D 40 0.56 
S X G X D 40 0.52 
£ < .05 
*** £ < .001 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Task 2 (Blind/^onblind); 
Second Scoring Method 
Source àf m P 
A (Age) 1 0.342 5.60* 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 0.0133 0.22 
C (Condition) 1 0.0239 0.46 
^ ( Similarity ) 1 0.980 27.30 
A X B 1 0.00857 0.14 
A X C 1 0.00504 0.10 
A X D 1 0.0292 0.81 
B X G 1 0.0608 1.17 
B X D 1 0.000146 0.00 
C X D 1 0.0270 0.97 
A X B X C 1 0.0650 1.25 
A X B X D T 0.138 3.84 
A X C X D 1 0.0119 0.43 
B X C X D 1 0.0359 0.97 
A X B X C X D 1 0.0200 0.72 
S (Subjects) 40 0.0610 
S X G 40 0.0518 
S X D 40 0.0359 
S X C X D 40 0.0278 
*2 <. .05 
*** 
Older children performed significantly better (£,< .05) on 
Task 2 than did younger children (6.70 versus 6.00), and scores on 
dissimilar items were significantly higher (2 ^  .001) than scores on 
similar items (6.9^ versus 5.76). Performance in the blind condition 
was clearly nonsignificantly different (2 > .25) from performance in 
the nonblind condition (6.20 versus 6.5O). 
A 3-way interaction (Age x Verbal Ability x Similarity) reached 
significance (£ < .05) under the first scoring approach, while just 
missing significance (2 = .O569) under the second scoring approach. 
Inspection of means for these groups revealed that high verbal/ young 
children performed better than low verbal/young children on dissimilar 
tasks, but showed no superiority on similar items. Older/high verbal 
children outperformed older/low verbal children on similar items, but 
the two older groups performed about equally well on dissimilar items. 
Latency on Task 1 as the Dependent Variable 
Additional analyses were performed for Task 1 with latency as 
the dependent variable, (it made no sense to compare latencies on 
Task 2 conditions because decoders in the blind condition were turned 
away from the toy objects, and the time required for the decoder to 
turn round and locate the objects—included in the response time— 
would artifactually inflate the time in the blind condition.) 
Five-factor and 3-factor An0vas revealed again that Reinfoircement 
was significant neither as a main effect nor in interaction with other 
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factors. To Insure stability of cell means, therefore, Reinforcement 
was dropped from further analysis and a 4-factor An ova was performed. 
Logarithms of the actual latencies were used in this analysis 
(Table 8)—as well as the preceding ones—to help normalize the 
positively skewed latency variable. (The means reported in the 
following paragraph, however, are given in seconds for more meaningful 
interpretati on.) 
Younger children responded significantly (£ <. .01) more slowly 
than did older children (7.55 seconds per item versus 5*21 seconds), 
and significantly more time (2 . OOl) was spent on similar than 
dissimilar items (7.02 seconds versus 5*65)» A 3-way interaction 
involving Verbal Ability, Condition, and Similarity was also found. 
High verbal and low verbal subjects took longer times on similar . items 
than on dissimilar ones. On dissimilar items, both groups performed 
more quickly on gestural items than on verbal itemso On similar items, 
however, high verbal and low verbal subjects reacted differently. Low 
verbal subjects required more time on gestural items than on verbal 
ones, while high verbal subjects, somewhat surprisingly, responded 
more slowly on verbal items than on gestural items. 
Performance of Adult Judges on Clues Given for Task 2 Items 
A ^-factor analysis of variance was computed using performance of 
the raters on Task 2 items as the dependent measure. The judges * 
scores were averaged for greater reliability. Reinforcement was again 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table 
for Task 1 (Verbal/Gestural) Latencies 
Source F 
A (Age) 1 0.894 
** 
9.99 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 0.0454 0.51 
C (Condition) 1 0.0808 1.49 
D Similarity) 1 0.458 
*** 
30.55 
A X B 1 0.0119 0,13 
A X C 1 0.00525 0.10 
A X D 1 0.00283 0.19 
B X C 1 0.0490 0.91 
B X D 1 0.000516 0.03 
C X D 1 0.000323 0.02 
A X B X C 1 0.00269 0.05 
A X B X D 1 0.014? 0.98 
A X C X D 1 0.00165 0.10 
B X C X D 1 0.0829 4.93* 
A X B X C X D 1 0.00192 0.11 
S (Subjects) 40 0.0895 
S X C 40 0.0541 
S X D 40 0;0150 
S X C X D 40 0.0168 
*2 ^  .05 
** 
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nonsignificant as a main effect, but a 4-#ay interaction that included 
Reinforcement narrowly reached significance (2 = >0^95)• Similarity 
was significant .01), as was Condition (£<1.0l). Age approached 
significance (2 = .053 )> and the Age x Condition interaction was 
significant at the 2 <. .05 level. 
The small num'ber of dyads (two to nine) in some cells, as before, 
raised concern about stability of cell means. In view of the relative 
ineffectiveness of the Reinforcement manipulation, it seemed 
appropriate once more to drop this factor from the analysis. A 
4-factor analysis of variance was then run, with Age and Verbal Ability 
as between-subject factors and Condition and Similarity as within-subject 
factors. Results of this analysis (Table 9) are congruent with the 
results of the 5-factor An ova. Raters performed significantly better 
(2 < .001) on dissirrdlar item clues than on clues given to similar 
items (means of 6.57 versus 5*^6) and did significantly better (2 < .01) 
on clues given in the blind condition than on clues given in the 
nonblind condition (6.3? versus 5»66). A significant (2 ^  .01) 
Age X Condition interaction was again found, with raters performing 
considerably better on the clues given by older children in the blind 
condition than on clues that younger children gave in that condition 
(6.95 versus 5«?8). For clues given in the nonblind condition, the age 
of the child giving the clue appeared to have little relationship to 
the raters' performance (5-67 on the clues of younger children versus 
5.66 on the clues of older children). 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table 
for Task 2 (Blind/Nonblind) Adult Judges' Performance 
Source MS F 
A (Age) 1 14.53 4.13^ 
B (Verbal Ability) 1 0.0435 0.01 
C (Condition) 1 21.17 11.87* 
D (Similarity ) 1 53.45 26.71 
A X B 1 7.51 2.14 
A X C 1 15.10 8.47' 
A X D 1 5.75 2.87 
B X C 1 1.76 0.98 
B X D 1 0.577 0.29 
C X D 1 0.150 0.13 
A X B X C 1 0.337 0«i9 
A X B X D 1 0.000222 0.00 
A X G X D 1 2.98 2.57 
B X C X D 1 0.256 0.22 
A X B X G X D 1 O.9O8 0.78 
S (Subjects) 39 3.51 
S X G 39 1.78 
S X D 39 2,00 
S X C X D 39 1.16 
*£ .05 
** £ ^  .01 
*** 
£ <. .001 
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Eatings of Clues "by Adult Judges as the Dependent Variable 
The two judges rated 1032 clues. On 998 of these clues, the 
judges assigned the response to the same category. Judges* ratings 
were in disagreement on 34 clues. The high percentage of agreement 
(9?%) suggests that the raters were able to make reliable judgments 
about the quality of the children's clues using the 9-poxnt rating 
scale. Pearson.product-moment correlations run between the judges' 
ratings yielded coefficients of .96 for clues given in the verbal 
condition, .97 for clues given in the blind condition, and .99 for 
clues given in the nonblind condition. All three correlations were 
significant well beyond the £ .001 level and provide further 
evidence of the reliability of the rating techniuque. 
A actor Anova was performed on the average of the adult 
ratings of Task 2 clues. Reinforcement, Age, and Verbal Ability were 
again between-subject factors, while Condition and Similarity were 
within-subject factors. Both within-subject factors were significant; 
Condition at 2 ^ .001 and Similarity at 2 ^  .01. The Age x Condition 
interaction and the Reinforcement x Age x Condition interaction were 
both significant at the £ < .05 level. 
Because Reinforcement was involved in a significant interaction, 
collapsing across the Reinforcement factor did not seem justified in this 
analysis. Nonetheless, the small number of observations in some cells 
suggested that cell means might be unstable and therefore raised 
questions about the reliability of the analysis. 
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Because Verlaal Ability was not significant either as a main 
effect or in interaction with other factors, it seemed reasonable to 
achieve cell stability in this instance by collapsing across the Verbal 
Ability dimension. Results of this 4-factor An ova with Reinforcement 
and Age as between-subject factors and Condition and Similarity as 
within-subject factors appear in Table 10. The results obtained in 
this analysis parallel results of the earlier ^ -factor analysis. 
Children received significantly .Ol) higher ratings on dissimilar 
items than on similar items (mean clue rating 7.06 versus 6.46). Clues 
given in the blind condition were rated as significantly better (j£<.00l) 
than clues given in the nonblind condition (7«45 versus 6.07). 
Examination of significant interactions revealed that older children 
received considerably higher ratings than younger children in the blind 
condition, whether reinforced or not. In the nonblind condition, 
however, younger children received higher ratings than the older 
children in the reinforcement condition, while older children again 
received higher ratings than the younger children in the n onreinf orcement 
condition. 
Encoders' Performance on Their Own Verbal Clues 
At the followup session, encoder subjects performed significantly 
better (P(l, 39) = 45.64, ^  "C .001) on clue-present items than on items 
for which they were required to guess the correct object. The 
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Table 10 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Adult Judges' Ratings 
of Clue Effectiveness 
Source F 
A (Reinforcement) 1 191.93 0.52 
B (Age) 1 750.97 2.02 
C (Condition) 1 4980.21 20.36*** 
D (Similarity) 1 927.25 
** 
12.07 
A X B 1 700.82 1.89 
A X C 1 333.40 1.36 
A X D 1 12.39 0.16 
B X G 1 1071.79 4.38* 
B X D 1 303.49 3.95 
C X D 1 81.18 1.55 
A X B X C 1 1048.73 4.29* 
A X B X D 1 76.06 0.99 
A X C X D 1 0.462 0.01 
B X C X D 1 9.09 0.17 
A X B X C X D 1 215.40 4.11* 
S (Subjects) 39 371.10 
S X C 39 244.56 
S X D 39 76.82 
S X C X D 39 52.39 
* / £ < .05 
** 
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mean proportion of correct guesses was .63, that of responses to clues, 
.87 (both proportions significantly above chance, £ .001). 
Encoder subjects' performance on their own verbal clues was 
compared with that of the two raters and the decoder subjects. (Only 
clues with ratings of six or above—inadequate and adequate verbal 
responses, with or without accompanying points—were used for this 
analysis.) Proportion of correct responses was .83 for the decoder, 
.85 for the adult raters (combined), and .8? for the encoder on 
followup. Differences among the three groups were not statistically 
significant; F(2, 78) = 2.23, £ .10. 
Additional analyses of these followup data were carried out using 
arcsine transformations to help normalize the distributions. Results 
of these analyses were in accord with the analyses done using proportions. 
Encoders' Performance on Poor Verbal Clues 
A further analysis of followup data was performed to see how 
accurately subjects could respond to their own poor clues—clues 
rated as inadequate verbal responses by the judges. Only items 
receiving ratings of six or seven (inadequate verbal response, 
inadequate verbal response with point) were used for this analysis. 
It should be noted that this analysis was carried out using the 
individual subject as the unit of observation; all previous analyses 
used the dyad as the observational unit. 
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Most encoders tended to give fairly good verlDal clues and 
relatively few clues received ratings of six or seven. It was 
necessary, for tiiis analysis, to find subjects who had given at least 
two poor verbal clues during the dyadic session and who, on followup, 
were administered at least one of these clues in the clue-present 
condition and at least one of these poor clue items in the guessing 
condition. Only 3I individual subjects met these requirements. For 
each individual subject, proportions of_ correct responses to these items 
were computed. Thirteen of the subjects performed better on items on 
which they had guessed at the correct answer, ten subjects performed 
better on clue-present items, and eight subjects performed equally well 
guessing or given their own clues. The data indicated that subjects did 
not in fact perform better when given their own poor verbal clues than 
when merely guessing the correct object on comparable items. Chi square 
analysis revealed nonsignificant differences between the number of 
subjects who did better guessing and the number who did better when 
given their own poor clues (3C^(l) = O.17). 
In a final analysis, performance of encoder subjects an their 
own poor clues was compared with the performance of decoder subjects 
and adult judges on the same poor clues. No significant difference 
was found among these three groups (£ > .10). 
(Pr 
Intercorrelations Among Dependent Variables 
Intercorrelations were calculated among the various dependent 
variables. Performance of the adult judges (averaged) correlated highly 
( r = .37, £ ^  .001) with performance of decoders in the dyadic setting 
and less highly with followup performance of the encoders on clue-present 
items (r = .35» £ 'C .05). The correlation "between decoder performance 
and encoder performance on clue-present items was .46 (£ C .01). Eatings 
of the adult judges (averaged) correlated quite highly with their own 
performance (r = .72, £ <.00l) while correlating somewhat lower 
with encoders' performance on clue-present items (r = .33» £<C«05)» 
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DISCUSSION 
Competency of Young Children in Dyadic Communication (Hypothesis l) 
Children who participated in this experiment demonstrated 
considerable competency on the communication tasks, performing 
significantly above chance on all task conditions and on all 
combinations of condition and item similarity. Subjects were 
capable of communicating with words and with gestures and were able 
to adjust their messages to the needs of their listeners. 
These results challenge the Piagetian notion that children 
below the age of 6 or 7 years are primarily egocentric in their 
speech to one another. The present study is in accord with recent 
research (Garvey & Hogan, 1973; Maratsos, 1973» Meissner & Apthorp, 
1976; Menig-Peterson, 1975) that suggests that young children's 
communicative skills have been underestimated by much of the pre-1970's 
work. 
Effects of Reinforcement on Performance (Hypothesis 2) 
Reinforcement had. no apparent effect on the children's 
performance. Contrary to prediction, reinforced dyads did not do 
significantly better than nonreinfoirced dyads on the communication 
tasks. Although many tests were run to assess the effect of the 
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reinfoircement manipulation, reinforcement was found to be significant 
only in a few higher-order interactions. In no analysis was 
reinforcement significant as a main effect or in a 2-way interaction. 
Given the number of tests performed, it is not surprising that 
reinforcement might appear in several significant interactions. 
The Beinforcement x Age x Condition x Similarity interaction, found 
when performance of adult raters was used as the dependent measure, 
is a case in point. This interaction barely attained significance 
(2 = 0.0^95)> and the interaction itself is uninterpretable. It seems 
reasonable that chance factors might explain its appearance. 
Reinforcement was also involved in a significant 3-way interaction 
(with Age and Condition) that appears more readily interprétable. In 
the blind condition, older children received higher clue ratings than 
the younger children under both reinforcement and nonreinforcement. 
In the n onblind/n on reinf orcement condition, older subjects again 
received higher ratings; but in the nonblind/reinforcement condition, 
younger subjects earned higher ratings. It would seem that older 
subjects in the nonblind/reinfoircement condition relied more on pointing 
and stereotypic responding than did the younger children in this 
condition, and thus older children's clues obtained lower ratings. 
Perhaps the older children were able to perceive more readily that it 
was possible to get a treat with minimal effort; their lowered ratings 
in the nonblind/reinforcement condition suggest that their performance 
may have been influenced by expediency. 
6? 
There are several possible explanations for the relative 
ineffectiveness of the reinforcement manipulation. The reinforcer 
used in this study—M & M candy—may not have been particularly salient 
for these children. The experimental situation itself appeared highly 
motivating to the subjects; the toys were attractive and the tasks 
novel and game-like in nature. Most of the dyads quickly became 
involved in the testing and seemed to enjoy the dyadic session a great 
deal. Many children spontaneously remarked that they were having fun 
or that they liked playing these "games." Only a few children seemed 
inattentive or complained about the length of the testing session. 
One might argue that reinforcement was superfluous for most of the 
children, that the task itself was pleasurable enough so that 
participation in it was inherently reinforcing and rewards unnecessary. 
Slkind's (l97l) theory of stimulus-nutriment seeking may also 
be useful in explaining the ineffectiveness of reinforcement in this 
situation. According to Elkind, children tend to perform at maximal 
capacity during the early stages of skill acquisition. During this 
period, the child performs as well as he/she can perform. It is only 
later—after the skill has been completely mastered—that performance 
drops off and external incentives to perform become necessary. Although 
Elkind's theory deals chiefly with the acquisitiaiof cognitive skills, 
it seems applicable to communicative skills as well. During the 
preschool period, the young child's ability to convey information to 
others is growing and developing. It is possible that at this young 
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age, the child is already performing at the level of his/her capacity 
and that reinforcement, for this reason, results in little improvement 
in performance. Reinforcement may be effective only for older children 
whose communicative skills are more highly developed. 
Gestural versus Verbal Ccmmunication (Hypothesis 3) 
Under the first scoring method (number right out of total number 
administered), children performed significantly better in the gestural 
condition. Using the second scoring method (number right out of those 
scorable), no significant differences in performance were found. As 
discussed earlier, the first scoring method seems more statistically 
sound because it produces a distribution of scores that more closely 
approximates the normal curve. Although the second scoring approach 
is less desirable, failure to duplicate findings with this approach 
indicates that verbal-gestural differences may be influenced by 
scoring strategy. 
Subjects in the verbal condition used pointing and gesturing more 
often than subjects in the gestural condition used points or words in 
their communication. More verbal items than gestural items were marked 
as questionable. Under the first scoring approach, questionable items 
counted as incorrect answers, and because there were more questionable 
items in the verbal condition, this scoring method favored the gestural 
condition. The presence of more questionable items in the verbal 
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condition suggests that subjects found it generally easier to 
communicate with gestures alone than with words alone. 
It might be recalled that in the Pascual-Leone and Smith (I969) 
research, 5-year old children (the youngest subjects in that study) 
performed significantly better in the gestural encoding condition than 
in the verbal encoding condition. As mentioned earlier, the use of 
different items for gestural and verbal conditons seems a methodological 
flaw in the study that makes interpretation of these results difficult. 
In addition, Pascual-Leone and Smith did not permit verbal encoders 
to use the object names as clues. Thus, as Glucksberg, Krauss, and 
Higgins (1975) point out, the child's dominant or most probable verbal 
response was prohibited, while no such restrictions were placed upon 
encoders in the gestural condition. 
In the present study, the verbal encoder was permitted to use any 
words he or she liked, and the encoder was not limited to one word. 
The same items were used for verbal and gestural conditions to insure 
that item difficulty was approximately equal. It could reasonably be 
argued that the task of the verbal encoder was made easier in the 
present study, while requirements for the gestural encoder were left 
unchanged. Despite these'changes, this study in general supports 
Pascual-Leone and Smith's findings that younger children perform better 
on gestural tasks than on verbal ones. 
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Comparison of latencies on verbal and gestural items shows 
no significant difference in speed of responding. This is somewhat 
surprising since verbal communication is the typical, everyday mode of 
communicating and children have had substantially more practice 
communicating with woids than with gestures. Qie might also speculate 
that gestures would take longer to execute and would thus be a more 
cumbersome, less rapid mode of communication. Although there are 
intuitive reasons for suspecting that subjects would respond more 
quickly in the verbal condition, results here suggest that the two 
modes of communication are about equally efficient. 
Maptation to the Needs of a Blind Listener (Hypothesis 4) 
Evidence of this study indicates that children are able to 
tailor their messages to the needs of a blind listener. Subjects here 
were informed on Task 2 that they were free to communicate in any 
fashion they wished—with words, gestures, or a combination of the two. 
Pointing was also permitted on this task. Communicating to the sighted 
decoder was thus relatively simple because several methods of 
communication were available to the encoder. Subjects communicating 
to a blind decoder, however, had to recognize that pointing or 
gesturing would be ineffective and that only clearly differentiated 
verbal responses would permit the decoder to choose the correct 
objecto Although communication in the blind condition was surely 
more difficult than communication in the nonblind condition, analysis 
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revealed, no significant difference in performance in the two 
conditions. Dyads performed as well in the "blind condition as in the 
nonblind condition. 
When performance of the adult raters was used as the dependent 
variable, however, significant differences were found under the two 
conditions. Mult judges performed significantly better on clues 
given by children in the blind condition than on clues given in the 
nonblind condition. This finding shows that clues in the blind 
condition were in some way better—more complete, more detailed, or 
more informative—than clues in the nonblind condition. It seems 
likely that many clues given in the nonblind condition were dependent 
on visual or nonverbal clues of the encoder. These clues were not 
available to the adult judges, and the judges* performance on nonblind 
clues was considerably poorer, as a result, than the performance of 
peer decoders. 
Analysis of the clue ratings given by the judges confirms this 
hypothesis. Ratings of clues given in the blind condition were 
significantly higher than the ratings of clues given in the nonblind 
condition. Children did in fact give more elaborated verbal clues when 
in the blind condition than when in the nonblind condition. 
Several investigators have contended that young children can take 
the perspective of an adult listener and alter their communication 
appropriately. Maratsos (1973) and Meissner and Apthorp (1976) found 
that subjects in their studies pointed when the experimenter could see 
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and verbalized when the experimenter was blindfolded. Meissner and 
Apthorp contended that their preschool subjects engaged in "oomimxnication 
mode switching" that was dependent on the status of the listener. 
Results of the present study are in agreement with such an 
hypothesis. With peer decoders, preschoolers showed an ability to 
tailor their communications to the needs of their audience similar to 
the ability shown by the children in the Maratsos and Meissner and 
Apthorp studies. The children in the present study performed competently 
in both blind and nonblind conditions, but tended to give more nonverbal, 
unelaborated messages in the nonblind condition. Subjects were aware of 
the special needs of the blind decoder and, as the ratings show,-tended 
to give significantly more messages that were later rated highly by the 
judges when communicating to the decoder in the blind condition. The 
present study, then, provides additional evidence that young children 
are indeed capable of adapting their communication to the needs of 
their listeners. 
Verbal Ability and Performance (Hypothesis 5) 
As children grow older, their vocabularies grow larger. Thus 
age and vocabulary are positively correlated—confounded. Because of 
this, a decision was made in this study to use scaled vocabulary 
scores—adjusted for age—instead of raw vocabulary scores. Age and 
verbal ability factors were therefore made orthogonal. 
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Verbal aMlity was related to Task 1 performance when the first 
scoring approach was used. On Task 2, verbal ability seemed related to 
younger children's performance on dissimilar items and older children's 
performance on similar items. Both groups of older children handled 
dissimilar items with ease, but on similar items the high verbal 
group outperformed the low verbal group. Similar items were difficult 
for both groups of younger children, and it was only on dissimilar 
items that significant differences between high verbal and low verbal 
children in the younger group emerged. 
Analyses of Task 1 latencies suggest that high verbal children 
take longer on similar verbal items, while low verbal children take 
longer on similar gestural items. Perhaps high verbal children engage 
in more extensive comparison activity on similar items as they search 
for descriptions that would enable the encoder to diffeirentiate 
referent from nonreferent. More thorough comparison activity may 
result in an increase in the amount of time spent on similar items. 
Asher aid.îkike(1975)» ^ their study of grade school children, 
found no relationship between IQ scores and communication accuracy. 
Krauss and Glucksberg(l969)similarly found no evidence that intelligence 
is related to communicative performance when age is considered. In the 
present study, with age differences removed, there were still suggestions 
that verbal intelligence is involved in communicative success. 
Generalizations about the relationship of verbal skills to communicative 
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performance, however, seem simplistic; the age of the child and the 
nature of the task must also be considered. 
Encoders* Performance with Their Own Clues (Hypothesis 6) 
Children were seen for a followup visit approximately two weeks 
after the original dyadic session. Subjects did perform significantly 
better on clue-present items than on items for which they were simply 
asked to guess the correct item. Even on the latter items, however, 
children chose the correct object 63% of the time, performing better 
than chance and suggesting that memory played a role in their guessing. 
When encoders' accuracy in responding to their own clues was 
compared to that of adult raters and dyadic partners, no significant 
differences were found. The encoders' clues seemed no more effective 
to the encoder than they had. been to other listeners. 
Only two prior studies could be found in which the speaker's 
accuracy in responding to his/her own messages was actually checked. 
In the earlier of the two reports, Glucksberg, Krauss, and Vîeisberg 
(1966) tested children with their own clues immediately after their 
participation in a referential communication task. Although subjects' 
performance on their own encodings was nearly perfect, memory alone 
might have accounted for these results. Asher and Qien (1976), testing 
children two weeks after their participation in a referential 
experiment, found that poor communicators were no more effective than 
other subjects in responding to their own clues. 
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Findings of the present study are in agreement with As her and 
Oden's results. With memory controlled for, subjects seem no more able 
to use their own clues than are other listeners. 
A Piagetian might argue that decodezs and encoders should irespond 
about equally well to adeq^uate verbal clues, with real discrepancies 
in performance arising only on clues that seem inad.eq.uate to the decoder, 
(because the latter are more likely to be egocentric). Although 
relatively ineffective to a listener, such clues are thought to be 
idiosyncratic and filled with private meaning for the child who uttered 
them. Examination of children's performance on clues rated as 
inadequate revealed that children performed no better with their own 
poor clues than they performed when guessing on comparable items. 
Encoders' performance on their own inadequate clues was also no better 
than the performance of adult or peer listeners. This is particularly 
interesting given that the encoders all had prior experience with the 
items and had all been informed at one time in the past of the identity 
of the correct item. Even with some advantage attributable to memory, 
the encoder was still no better in responding to his own poor clues 
than were the naive peer decoder and adult judges. 
Similar versus Dissimilar Items (Hypothesis 7) 
The most uniformly consistent finding in the entire study was 
that children performed significantly better on items containing 
dissimilar objects than on items containing similar objects. Dissimilar 
76 
items seemed easier for the subjects, and latencies for dissimilar 
items were significantly shorter than latencies for similar items. 
Adult judges performed significantly better on clues given dissimilar 
items, and dissimilar item clues were also rated more highly than the 
clues given on similar items. 
This study, using object pairs and preschool subjects, parallels 
Asher's work using woid pairs and older children. Asher has contended 
that his results support the comparison activity hypothesis. On 
dissimilar items, subjects need engage only in sampling activity because 
nearly any word associated with the referent will suffice. On similar 
pairs, however, sampling activity is not enough. After devising a 
possible clue, the encoder must engage in comparison activity to 
determine if that clue is more closely associated with the referent than 
the nonreferent. The poor performance of these preschool subjects on 
similar object pairs suggests that the comparison activity explanation 
is applicable to young children as well as to the elementary school 
children Asher studied. 
Age and Performance on Referential Communication Tasks 
Many investigators (Cohen & Klein, 1968; Feffer & Gourevitch, 
I96O; Flavell, et al., I968; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975» Mossier, Marvin, & 
Greenberg, 1976; Sullivan & Hunt, I967) have documented tha.t role-taking 
ability and communicative skills improve with age. West (l97^) 
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argues, in fact, that age is the only "standard and consistently related 
variable" to role-taking ability. 
Typically, research in this area has been performed with subjects 
representing a broad age span—often a range of five or more years. 
When a more restricted age range has been sampled, age trends have often 
been less pronounced and sometimes nonsignificant (Meissner & Apthorp, 
1976; Mueller, 1972). 
Despite the narrowness of the age range in the present study (two 
years), age nevertheless seemed to play an important role in the 
performance of the children. With subjects split into younger and older 
dyad-s, the older dyads outperformed the younger on both Tasks 1 and 2. 
Superiority of the older dyads was found on both scoring methods. In 
addition, older dyads responded significantly more quickly than younger 
dyads. Differences between older and younger subjects seemed more 
pronounced in the blind condition. Adult judges performed significantly 
better on the clues given by older children in the blind condition than 
on clues given by younger children in that condition. Clues given by 
older children in the blind condition were also rated significantly 
better than clues given by younger children. 
As Wohlwill (1970) has pointed out, age is not an independent 
variable, and it is not possible to make causal inferences on the basis 
of these findings. Because age is related to vocabulary size, 
intellectual development, and verbal skill, differences in performance 
associated with age may be reflecting differential cognitive skill 
and/or differential maturational levels. 
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Concluding comments 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the child's 
communicative deficiencies. Piaget, Flavell, and other investigators 
have stressed egocentrism and faulty role-taking ability, while Asher 
and others have emphasized inadequate comparison activity and failure 
to consider nonreferents in formulation of messages. A third 
explanation has been offered by Cohen and Klein, who suggest limited 
verbal facility as the major reason for the young child's poor 
communicative performance. This study attempted to assess the validity 
of these three theories testing a number of hypotheses derived from 
the theories. Results of this study seem most compatible with 
comparison activity explanations. 
If limited verbal ability masks the young child's communicative 
competence, then subjects should do better on gestural tasks than on 
verbal ones, and highly verbal children should outperform less verbally 
gifted children. Results of this study provide only minimal support 
for this theory. Under the first scoring method, children did in fact 
do better on gestural items and overall performance on Task 1 was 
related to verbal ability. No significant relationship between verbal 
ability and performance was found using the second scoring technique. 
On the whole, age seemed moire related to performance than did 
verbal ability. ¥ith age controlled for, verbal ability was not 
uniformly associated with higher performance, (it should be noted that 
subjects in this sample tended to be rather bright, and the range of 
scaled vocabulary scores was somewhat restricted. Had children with a 
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wider range of verbal ability been sampled, the influence of this 
variable upon performance might have been more marked.) Although the 
results of this study are not counter to the Cohen and Klein view, they 
fail to provide much confirmatory evidence concerning the importance of 
verbal ability in communicative performance. 
Tests of Piagetian predictions provided far less equivocal results. 
Piagetians—and others who see egocentrism as responsible for children's 
communicative deficiencies—would predict that reinforcement would be 
ineffective in producing improvements in communicative performance, that 
young children would be equally egocentric in gestural and verbal 
communication, that dyads in the nonblind condition would outperform 
dyads in the blind condition, and that encoders would be able to use 
their own clues, even if those clues held little meaning for others. 
For the most part, the results of this study were counter to these 
predictions. Only the failure of reinforcement substantially to 
improve performance is in accord with Piagetian theory. 
Results of this study seem most congruent with Asher's view on 
the importance of comparison activity. In accord with predictions, 
dissimilar items were uniformly easier than similar items for the 
children. On dissimilar items, careful evaluation of potential clues 
was unnecessary; only on similar items was extensive comparison activity 
required for successful performance. Dyads' poor performance on similar 
items corresponds to Asher and Oden's (19?6) findings using 
similar and dissimilar word pairs. 
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Contrary to Piagetian predictions, children here did not seem to 
find their own poor clues more meaningful than others found them to be. 
Encoders* performance on their own clues did not significantly exceed 
performance of peer decoders or adult judges. These findings support 
Asher's contention that faulty comparison activity, not egocentrism, 
accounts for poor communication. Poor clues do not seem to have private 
meaning to the speaker—they are simply clues that do not adeq.uately 
distinguish referent from nonreferent. A poor clue seems of no more 
use to the child who gave it than to any other person who might receive 
it. 
If children's poor clues have little private meaning, then it can 
not convincingly be argued that egocentrism accounts for poor 
communicative performance. Glucksberg, Krauss, and Higgins (1975) 
have attempted to specify the behavioral components that enter into 
communicative performance. According to these authors, the encoder 
must be sensitive to the referent-nonreferent array, sensitive to the 
listener, and sensitive to feedback from the listener. Piaget, Flavell, 
and others have typically emphasized the young child's insensitivity to 
the listener. The present study and Asher's work, however, suggest 
that failure to discriminate between attributes of the referent and 
nonreferents (inadequate comparison activity) is a more parsimonious 
explanation of communicative failure on referential tasks. 
The notion that the young child is oblivious to the needs of his 
listener no longer seems tenable. Flavell's (1963) contention that 
the preoperational child "makes little real effort to adapt his speech 
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to the needs of the listener" (p.156) is contradicted by results 
showing that subjects in this study gave more elaborate verbal 
messages when communicating to a nonsighted encoder. Naturalistic 
and experimental research reviewed earlier in this paper provides 
additional evidence that the child alters his/her mode of communication 
appropriately when communicating to a listener with special needs. It 
may be the case that earlier research on children's communication used 
tasks that were beyond the cognitive capabilities of the children 
studied. Task complexity may have obscured role-taking and communicative 
skills that young children do in fact possess. 
For nearly half a century Piaget's views on the egocentricity of 
young children's communication have gone relatively unchallenged and 
virtually untested. This study lends support to a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that children are far more competent communicators 
than developmentalists have traditionally thought. 
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